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Abstract
This article examines for the first time to what extent the lived experience of long-term
prisoners matches the normative theory of criminal punishment as moral communica-
tion. The findings are based on 27 narrative interviews with men at different stages of a
long-term prison sentence. The analysis suggests that Antony Duff’s normative vision of
punishment as moral communication may be difficult to realise in practice because of
the inevitable pressures on defendants in the courtroom and on prisoners during their
incarceration. In the court, the men’s attention was focused on the length of the sen-
tence imposed; they were often overwhelmed by emotion and did not interact with the
court as a moral arena. Within prison the men tended to accept their sentence in order
to make bearing their incarceration easier. Comparing these men’s lived experiences of
punishment with Duff’s normative theory highlights problems with the theory’s poten-
tial implementation but also reveals normative problems with current practices of
sentencing and sanctioning.
Keywords
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Introduction
This article reports the findings of a research project examining long-term pris-
oners’ accounts of their sentence. Many authors have pointed out the importance
of examining offenders’ views of the criminal justice process. It has been argued
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that soliciting offenders’ accounts is necessary in order to describe the criminal
justice system accurately, examine and possibly change it (Casper, 1972), to pro-
mote respect for the system (McGinnis and Carlson, 1981) because disrespect for
the system may lead to further crime (Alpert and Hicks, 1977; Sherman, 1993) and
to make rehabilitation more likely (Larson and Berg, 1989). Several authors have
also highlighted the need to investigate the lived (subjective) experience of punish-
ment in relation to normative theories, in order to understand what it is that the
theory is aiming to justify (Kolber, 2009; Rex, 2005). This article examines for the
first time to what extent one influential theory, namely Antony Duff’s theory of
punishment as moral communication, matches up with conditions in the ‘real
world’ of sentencing and sanctioning. Based on 27 narrative interviews with
long-term prisoners, it discusses whether punishment can serve as a form of
moral communication in the context of court and prison experiences. By compar-
ing a normative theory of what punishment should be with an empirical analysis of
what sense the punished make of punishment, this article aims to shed light on both
questions and ultimately to contribute to debates about the relationships between
purposes and practices of punishment.
The philosophy of punishment and moral communication
There are two main schools of thought in the justification of punishment: conse-
quentialism and retributivism. Consequentialist theories state that punishment is
justified if, and to the extent that, it has a positive effect on the world by reducing
crime (e.g. through deterrence, reform, rehabilitation or incapacitation).
Retributive theories justify punishment with reference to the crime committed.
They hold that there is an intrinsic link between wrongdoing and punishment,
with the sentence seen as the offender’s ‘just deserts’, and argue that consequen-
tialist justifications fail because they do not explain the necessary link between the
original crime and the punishment. However, others have argued that many
retributive theories, in turn, fail to make sense of the idea that punishment
should bring about at least some future good (Duff, 1996; Rex, 2005), the for-
ward-looking element of punishment.
One influential theory that attempts to explain both the connection to the crime
committed and the need for possible positive impact is Antony Duff’s (1996, 1999,
2001, 2003a) carefully elaborated theory of communicative punishment. Duff
(2001: 95) argues that when serious wrongs are committed, more is needed than
just verbal censure and an apology: ‘To think that [the offender] could just apolo-
gise, and then return to her normal life, would be to portray the wrong as a rela-
tively trivial matter that did not seriously damage the victim or their relationship.’
He thereby explains the link between crime and punishment: the wrong com-
mitted requires some kind of redress. This redress is delivered through ‘hard treat-
ment’ or punishment, which is intended as a two-way communication. It
demonstrates to offenders the extent to which they have done wrong and focuses
their attention on their crime and its consequences. At the same time, the hard
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treatment constitutes a message from the offender. Duff (2003a: 300) writes that it
is ‘a material and forceful expression of the apology that [the offender] owes to
those whom she wronged – to the direct victim of her crime, if there was one, and to
the wider community whose values she flouted’.
The wording here is important: hard treatment is an expression of the apology
that is owed, but this does not make it necessary that the offender is actually
repentant. When this is not the case, the sentence is still seen as having given
adequate weight to what happened. The forward looking element of Duff’s
theory, however, depends on the hard treatment being capable of bringing about
repentance and behavioural change. Besides having a communicative function hard
treatment is also an enforced secular penance (Duff, 2003a), which ideally leads to
the offender accepting responsibility and changing their ways (Duff, 1999).
However, while this is an aim of the punishment, it is not the justification (this is
not a consequentialist theory) and the enforced penance cannot be continued
simply on the basis that the offender has not repented.
Duff’s (2003b: 192) account of criminal punishment focuses on community
penalties, which he argues are by far the best suited to fulfilling the role of ‘com-
municative penance’ and should be used much more extensively. Imprisonment
should only play a very small role in the kind of criminal justice system he envis-
ages, as punishment for the most serious of crimes. He writes:
The message of imprisonment is that the offender has not just damaged or threatened,
but has broken, the normative bonds of community. He has made it impossible for us
to live with him in the ordinary community of fellow citizenship unless and until he
has undergone this penitential punishment. (Duff, 2001: 150, emphasis in original)
Imprisonment, on Duff’s account, communicates a need for exclusion to the offen-
der, although he stresses this exclusion should always be temporary.
The relevance of lived experience
As Rex (2005: 3) has written, the views of those affected by criminal justice deci-
sions cannot disprove normative theories: ‘you cannot prove an ‘‘ought’’’. Even a
finding that no prisoner has ever felt rehabilitated does not show that criminal
punishment should not be justified by its rehabilitative function. Besides, Duff
(2003a) has unequivocally stated that his account does not justify punishment as
it is practised in our current society. Does the lived experience of punishment
matter, then, to normative theories in general and Duff’s theory in particular?
Various writers have pointed out that, even if theories only justify an ideal
system of punishment, they do need to be applicable to the world we live in. For
example, Murphy (1994: 58) writes ‘a theory may be formally correct (i.e. coherent
or true for some possible world) but materially incorrect (i.e. inapplicable to the
actual world in which we live)’. Moreover normative theories have been used to
change penal practices. For example, Duff’s emphasis on the moral education of
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the offender has found an expression in the cognitive behavioural programmes that
are now being run for offenders on probation as part of the ‘What Works’ agenda
(Robinson, 2008). This type of influence, where aspects of a theory are taken on
board or borrowed by policy makers, necessitates examination of whether the
practice is actually true to the theory (see also McNeill, 2012) and whether all
aspects of the theory that the justification of punishment depends upon are in
place. If either of these conditions is not fulfilled, then the practice cannot be
justified with reference to the theory. It is clear that Duff (2001: 201) wants current
practice to be examined against his theory, when he writes: ‘the task of justifying
criminal punishment . . . is the task of so transforming the content and context of
criminal punishment that it can become what it ought to be’.
In examining the lived experiences of punishment against this normative theory,
then, this article is intended both to highlight problems with the theory and provide
insight into how our system might need to change in order to deliver punishments
that can be justified as moral communication.
Perceptions of the purpose of punishment
Few studies have focused specifically on the purpose of prisons in offenders’ eyes.
Of the ones that have been conducted, most have found that prison is seen as
failing in its aims to rehabilitate and reform (Halsey, 2007; Kolstad, 1996;
Patrick and Marsh, 2001). Prisoners feel that, because they are confined with
other offenders, they learn about crime, making them more likely to offend
(Halsey, 2007; Kolstad, 1996). Deterrence has also been found to be only partially
successful. Halsey’s (2007) narrative research with incarcerated young men in
Australia, found that while they saw deterrence as an intended effect of their impris-
onment, they felt it was not achieved because the environment was not sufficiently
aversive, was familiar and provided respite from a more difficult life on the outside.
Other research has found that (ex)prisoners do want to avoid further punishment,
indicating that they have been deterred by their previous sentence(s) (Burnett,
2004). In relation to the punitive function of sentences, Sexton (2012) found that
among long-term prisoners in the USA perceptions of punishment increased when
conditions were seen as symbolic (e.g. lack of health care as symbolic of lack of
concern for inmate’s well-being) and when the salience of punishment was high.
In studies touching on perceptions of punishment, the criminal justice system as
a whole has been found to be positioned as a mighty adversary in the accounts of
violent offenders in the USA (Presser, 2008) and remand prisoners in Norway
(Ugelvik, 2013), with experience of punitive regimes sometimes increasing feelings
of hostility towards the criminal justice system (Franke et al., 2010). The well-
developed literature on legitimacy (Beetham, 1991) of prisons in the UK, on the
other hand, suggests that some features of the prison environment might make a
critical examination of one’s sentence difficult. Carrabine (2004) and Sparks et al.
(1996) have pointed out that the reality and imposed routines of imprisonment can
make power relations in the prison seem inevitable, which means that these often
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go unquestioned. Crewe’s (2009) ethnography of HMP Wellingborough suggests
that the actual sentence may also remain unexamined by many prisoners, because
many are either resigned to a life of imprisonment, take their situation for granted
or accept their sentence as fair. In his typology of reactions to imprisonment, it is
only the ‘stoics’ and ‘players’ (less than a third of prisoners in the study) who might
oppose their sentence on moral grounds. The literature on the legitimacy of impris-
onment has also linked staff–prisoner relationships, the provision of material goods
and visits, and the way in which power in prison is operationalised to the legitimacy
of the regime in prisoners’ eyes (Carrabine, 2004; Sparks et al., 1996). Research on
the quality of life in prisons has found that prisoners additionally need to be able to
give their experience meaning, and to feel trusted and recognised as human beings
to experience the prison as legitimate (Liebling, 2013; Liebling et al., 2011).
Studies examining communicative aspects of sentencing have tended to be obser-
vational studies, which did not seek the perspective of offenders. Generally, com-
munication between the judge and the offender has been found to be more common
in youth courts (or Children’s Hearings in Scotland) than in adult courts, although
even in the former any such communication tends to be formulaic and fails to take
the form of a dialogue (Bouhours and Daly, 2007; Daly and Bouhours, 2008;
Kupchik, 2004; Rap and Weijers, 2011). Communication is also more common
in problem-solving courts (Dzur and Mirchandani, 2008), but the focus is often on
the progress made by the offender, meaning that communication is supportive and
encouraging, rather than censorious (McIvor, 2009). The findings described here
are intended to address this lack of knowledge about how any moral messages
contained in sentencing are perceived. However, the focus is not only on the
moment of sentencing, but also on the ongoing experience of serving the sentence.
More specifically, this article examines the experiences of men serving prison sen-
tences of four years or longer (long-term sentences) in Scotland.
Methodology
Twenty-seven adult male long-term prisoners were interviewed at different stages of
their sentence. Table 1 gives some basic information about each of the men, along
with the pseudonyms they chose, which will be used in the remainder of this article.
Those who were still incarcerated were interviewed in two Scottish prisons, and
those on licence in two criminal justice social work offices near Glasgow. Most
interviews lasted between one and one-and-a-half hours, with the shortest interview
39minutes and the longest two hours and 20minutes. A combined methodology
was used for all the interviews. The initial stage of the interviews was narrative,
with a focus on the way the men interpreted their sentence and incorporated it in
their wider life story. Then, if they had not touched upon questions of legitimacy
and purpose, they were asked specifically about these topics through semi-struc-
tured questions. This methodology was not meant to uncover ‘what really hap-
pened’. It is now well acknowledged that qualitative interviews do not simply
transfer information held by the participant on what happened to the researcher
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Table 1. Participants’ characteristics
Name Age History Offence type Sentence
Start of sentence
Alan 40s Previous short-term sentence Drugs 4–5 years
Chris 40s Previous short-term sentences Drugs 4–5 years
David 35–39 No previous convictions Driving 6–7 years
Malcolm 30–34 Previous long-term sentence Drugs 6–7 years
Paul 40s No previous convictions Driving 6–7 years
Walter 30–34 Previous short-term sentences Threats 4–5 years
End of sentence
Alex 35–39 Previous long-term sentence Violence 10 years
Colin 30–34 Previous short-term sentences Drugs 4–5 years
Dan 60s Previous long-term sentences Violence 5–6 years + ext
licencea
Devan 20–24 No previous convictions Drugs 7–8 years
Doug 25–29 Previous short-term sentences Violence 4–5 years + ext
licence
Gordon 20–24 No previous imprisonment Violence 4–5 years
Graham 30–34 Previous short-term sentences Violence 4–5 years
Ian 30–34 Previous long-term sentences Theft 7–8 years + ext
licence
James 35–39 Previous long-term sentences Drugs + violence 10 years
Neil 40s Previous long-term sentence Drugs 10 years
Peter 20–24 Previous short-term sentences Violence 10 years
Robert 60s Previous short-term sentence Drugs 4–5 years
Licence
Andy 25–29 Previous short-term sentences Violence 4–5 years
Jack 40s Previous long-term sentence Robbery 8–9 years
Lino 35–39 Previous long-term sentences Weapon 4–5 years
Mark 35–39 Previous short-term sentences Violence 5–6 years
Mohammed 30–34 Previous long-term sentence Violence 8–9 years
Smitty 25–29 Previous short-term sentences Drugs + driving 5–6 years
Stephen 50s Previous long-term sentence Violence 4–5 years
Tim 25–29 No previous imprisonment Murder Life
Tony 50s Previous long-term sentences Robbery 13 years
Note: a +ext licence ¼ plus extended licence, an extra period under supervision in the community. Adapted
from Schinkel (2014) with permission from Palgrave.2
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(e.g. Holstein and Gubrium, 1997; Riessman, 2008). Instead, interviews are sites of
meaning construction, where the active interpretation and selective description by
participants of their experiences is influenced by the interview setting, context, audi-
ence and issues of what can be remembered and put into words (Polkinghorne, 2007).
Issues of memory are especially significant for the men on licence and the men at the
end of their sentence. Their descriptions of their experiences of the court case (and,
for those on licence, the sentence) may have been less than perfectly accurate, as it is
difficult for people to remember their attitudes and beliefs over long periods (Ruspini,
2000). In addition, being interviewed by a researcher, who is ostensibly not herself
involved in offending, and the fact that they were interviewed in criminal justice
premises, is likely to have put pressure on the interviewees to distance themselves
from their past behaviour (see also Presser, 2008). Accordingly, the findings below do
not aim to describe actual moral communication that took place in the courtroom or
the prison; that is a task for which observational studies are better suited. The men’s
recollections of what happened in the courtroom will have been influenced by their
subsequent experiences, problems with recall and more active processes of selecting
material to fit their view of themselves or their life. But by examining prisoners’
perceptions of moral communication it becomes possible to ascertain the salience
of such communication for its recipients and to examine how the pressures of pris-
oners’ situations, as well as their motivations and (desired) identities impacted on the
way they narrated their experiences of moral communication.
Findings
Moral communication was much less salient than most other possible purposes,
notably reform, rehabilitation and deterrence, in the interviewees’ accounts. Most
of the men did not spontaneously refer to communication at all, and it loomed
large as a purpose for only one of the men. In what follows I focus on themes
developed across interviews, usually in response to targeted questions about moral
communication.
Moral communication in the courtroom
Many of the men remembered the attitude of the judge, if not his or her actual
words. More often than one would perhaps expect of long-term prisoners, they felt
the judge had shown a (partially) positive attitude towards them. Censure was far
from the only content of the communication, nor could the court process often be
characterised as a degradation ceremony, in which the whole offender was con-
demned (see also Daly and Bouhours, 2008; Presser, 2008). In several of the men’s
accounts the judge was described as highlighting the positive, rather than censuring
conduct:
I was expecting him to say like something like ‘this was a brutal, barbaric attack’ or
something like that, you know but he never even said anything like that . . . I can
584 Punishment & Society 16(5)
remember him saying ‘it shows here this report that you (.) eehm, (.) it shows extreme
remorse’ know what I mean and I can’t remember him saying anything bad about me
or anything like that, no. (Doug)1
Doug and others expected more censure than was delivered. Others even por-
trayed the judge as being on ‘their side’, describing how the judge’s comments
during their court case made it clear that they disapproved of the proceedings.
Tim was very young when he was charged with murder and recalled how the
judge questioned whether he could have been the sole person responsible for
what Tim described as ‘15 to 20 people mobbing and rioting in the street’. Tim
portrayed the judge as having been reluctant to imprison him:
He said ‘it saddens me tae see two families ruined (2) wi’ this’ and he says ‘I need tae
compose myself tae pass this sentence’ so he went away for five minutes and came
back after he composed himself and says (3). But he was bound by law that I was
found guilty wi’ my peers and he had tae sentence me, so. And that aspect I think
that’s how the eight years came into it as well.
In this description of the sentencing comments, the judge, rather than censuring
Tim and appealing to his morality, limited the censure that may have been per-
ceived as inherent in the hard treatment imposed, and also limited this hard treat-
ment as much as he was able.
Others, like Tim, positioned the judge as being bound by guidelines. Despite the
absence of sentencing guidelines in Scotland and the only mandatory sen-
tences being those for murder and third convictions of class A drug offences
(Jamieson et al., 2010), several of the men said the judge had no choice in their
punishment:
M: What do you think the purpose of giving you this prison sentence was for the
judge, like why did he give you six years in prison?
Paul: Well that’s [clears throat] judging by the crime, that’s the guidelines he’s went
with, nothing else (.) guidelines.
The way that Paul frames his answer suggests a need to neutralise the judge as a
moral arbiter. He emphasised that the guidelines determined the judges’ actions, in
saying that nothing else played a role, thereby denying any kind of moral judgement
or censure.
This neutralisation of the judge also sheds a different light on the previous
paragraphs, which discussed the positive communication and attitude of the
judge in some of the accounts. Participants might have selected positive rather
than negative aspects of communication, both in what they remembered
and what they chose to tell me, because being censured is likely to be painful.
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The following exchange with Jack shows that, at least sometimes, selective remem-
bering was intentional:
M: Did the Judge say anything when he sentenced you?
Jack: Not that I can remember no, it’s just like a kinda blank. I kinda just shove that
(2) see if you had a wee box in your heid an it was a box that if you fling somethin’ in it
never gets opened up again, I have like something like that. I flung it in it and forget/
try and just/never, know what I mean, just kid on it never even existed, it never
happened and just get on wi it.
M: Okay so what kind of things do you put in the box then?
Jack: Just like whatever/like ‘aye you’ve got nine year, you’ve been a bloody this and a
that to society’ or whatever. Whatever, it just/you know what I mean, he can say
whatever else he wants, because I’m no interested. I’m goin’ doon the stair tae get on
wi my sentence.
By bracketing the judge’s comments in this way, Jack consciously avoided any
censure directed at him, illustrating how identity and processes of meaning
making affect the impact of moral messages.
Although Jack was the only one to describe his own defence mechanisms, several
others also resisted the judge’s censure. Of those who remembered being censured,
most rejected the judge’s moral communication, for different reasons. Some felt
that the judge’s reading of the situation in which they had offended was unrealistic.
He said ‘taking into consideration the way you’ve been living your life, it’s been on the
streets’ and it was/he was like that ‘but you could have walked away from the boy’,
even though the boy was shouting and cursing and swearing at a girl I was with, he
was like ‘you could have walked away from it, instead of, instead of knocking him
out’. (Graham)
Graham disagreed with the judge’s reading of the situation, objecting that it is
not possible to walk away when someone is ‘shouting and cursing and swearing’ at
a girl. Others rejected the judge’s censure because they felt the judge did not know
them sufficiently and only judged them on their record, or because they felt the
judge attributed too many harmful consequences to them as an individual (e.g. in
relation to drug dealing). It is interesting that censure was resisted even if, as in the
example above, the judge condemned the offence committed, but not the whole
person, as recommended by Braithwaite (2000) in his theory or reintegrative sham-
ing. Conversely, when the judge engaged in stigmatisation, the condemnation of
the offender instead of the offence (Braithwaite, 2000), the men were not always
opposed to this, even though it has been predicted this should lead to defiance,
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especially for poorly bonded individuals (Sherman, 1993). Some of those who did
not reject or neutralise the censure directed at them in the courtroom were con-
demned as people by the judge.
James: Where the judge talked to me was in the XTC [ecstacy] one, because he had all
the records from the High Courts, all the previous High Courts and he called me an
evil man.
M: And what did you think of that?
James: In a way, aye, you ken what I mean. A lot, a lot of previous, about three or
four pages. So in a way, aye.
It is clear, though, that after the initial statement made by the judge, James has
had no further input from the criminal justice system in the way he thinks about his
crime or punishment. The tentativeness with which he comes to his conclusion
strongly suggests that he has never before reflected on the judge’s message despite
describing having long stretches of time for reflection in prison, which he saw as
having changed him. While censure was evident in the judge’s comments, they seem
to have had no further impact on James or his thinking, but instead have been left
behind in the courtroom.
Is moral communication in the courtroom possible?
Jack’s earlier quote, where he said the judge ‘can say whatever else he wants because
I’m no interested, I’m goin’ doon the stair tae get on wi’ my sentence’ illustrates a
problem with moral communication in the courtroom. For those who are expecting
and receiving long sentences, there is so much at stake that they are unlikely to hear
much beyond how long they have to spend in prison. Devan described vividly the
emotional impact hearing his (unexpectedly long) sentence had on him:
Judge turns around and looks at me and goes ‘Mr. X, you’re getting (.) seven and a
half years’, BOOM. [Laughs.] And I’m that ‘No way’. At that moment in time, I
thought he was joking, like. And then, I was frozen, I was still standing up there and
he was just talking, talking and talking and saying whatever he was saying. I was just
still standing there. I was just like ‘No way, man’.
It is telling that almost all of the men described the moment of sentencing with a
sense of real drama. Many struggled with the knowledge they were going to prison
for years, even when the sentence was (less than) expected.
You’re gutted, but you know it’s going to happen. When you’re out robbing people
you know you’re going to jail sooner or later. . . .But when I got this sentence I was
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gutted because the wean was only three weeks old at the time. That’s when you realise,
you know what I’m talking about? I’m going away for a while, but I don’t think you
realise it at the time. (Ian)
Ian’s quote illustrates that there are different ways of ‘knowing’: rationally
knowing versus realising viscerally that you will not see your family again; that
this is a certainty and no longer just a likelihood. Being shocked, like Devan, or
trying to assimilate the emotional reality of an expected sentence, like Ian, means
being deaf to anything going on in the courtroom. As Hudson (2002: 631) has
noted, what the judge says ‘is almost inevitably lost on the offender as he gives
his attention to the sentence’. In order to take on the meaning of a message, in a
way that leads to long-term attitude change, the recipient needs to be free
of distraction (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1998). This is
not true of someone who has just heard they are sentenced to long-term
imprisonment.
Furthermore, given the huge personal investment my interviewees had in the
outcome of their court case, it is not surprising that they did not submit to the court
as a moral arena but tried to manipulate the process in order to minimise their
sentence. Lino linked his untruthful ‘not guilty’ plea directly to the length of the
sentence he faced:
But, there was no way I was daein’ that [pleading guilty], the longest I’d spent in
prison was six months I think and that was/that felt like forever so I was like, there
was no way I was gonnae put my hands up to this.
The men’s sense that the courtroom did not have any great moral standing was
intensified by their view that the lawyers, and even the judges, were playing the
same game:
Peter: See, if I hadnae pled early, I would have walked fucking the eight year.
M: But why is that, usually if you plead early you get less, don’t you?
Peter: Aye, you get a third off your sentence, I know, but because they’d heard I’d put
in an early plea, they put my sentence up.
This replicates Casper’s (1972) finding that judges and prosecutors, like the
police, were seen by defendants as workers who sometimes take shortcuts, rather
than neutral or impartial actors and Ugelvik’s (2013) finding that remand prisoners
in Norway constructed the criminal justice system as an adversary that does not
play by its own rules. Carlen (1976), in an observational study, found that court
personnel often colluded with each other and were more concerned with their own
standing than with the case. This collusion of professionals was recognised
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by Devan, who felt this, along with much of what went on in court, made for an
unfair system:
Because, another thing that is crazy about this system and how things are up here
are/I know you and you know me, right, for instance. I represents the defendant,
you represents the Crown, the prosecutor. Me and you work in the SAME office,
right? We go to the same nightclubs or whatever, we go to the same bars or what-
ever. I actually speak to you ALL THE TIME. I actually know you, we’re friends,
and YOU’RE UP AGAINST ME. Is that not a JOKE AND A HALF, man?
When court actors attempt to manipulate outcomes, bargain with the defendant
for a guilty plea or collude in a visible way, this not only reduces the moral standing
of the courts in offenders’ eyes, but also problematises the communication of cen-
sure through sentencing. Weijers (2004) has noted that moral communication is less
likely to take place in an adversarial system than in an inquisitorial system, because
in the former most of the proceedings take the form of a contest between prosecu-
tors and defenders. In this research, some of those who had been defendants pos-
itioned themselves, too, as active participants in the court contest. But the more
courtroom proceedings become (or are interpreted as) an adversarial game, the
weaker any moral communication becomes. How the moral element is lost is
clearly described by Mohammed:
I think at the time during the trial, all I’m interested in is getting away wi’ it. It’s after
the trial’s done wi’ and you’re doing the time and you kinda look at it and you think
‘that was a lot more serious than I kinda thought at the time’.
If the sentence is settled upon for reasons of expediency (avoiding the expense of
a trial) or through manipulation of the rules and processes by court actors (as well
as defendants themselves), then the link between the amount of censure inherent in
the sentence and the initial offence is surely lost.
There are three main reasons, then, why moral communication is problematic
in a court with the power to impose long-term prison sentences. So much
depends on the exact length of the sentence and the emotional impact of being
imprisoned is so great that the offender is unlikely to attend to any moral com-
ments made by the judge. Second, the stakes are so high that offenders are highly
tempted to manipulate the outcome, thereby rejecting the moral dimension of
court proceedings. Finally, analogous manipulation by court actors lessens the
moral standing of the court and diminishes the extent to which the sentence can
be seen as censure deserved for the initial offence. With the court such a prob-
lematic site of moral communication, the next section examines whether the
moral dimensions of crime and punishment were more successfully explored
within the prison.
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Moral communication in prison
Most interviewees commented that the only time their offence, their sentence and
questions of morality were discussed within the prison was during cognitive
behavioural courses. For example, Dan said ‘the only people who spoke to me
about my offence here were the people in the courses’. Some of the men had not
been assessed as needing these, and were therefore left without any discussion of
moral questions or the meaning of their sentence. Robinson (2008: 438) has
argued that some of the cognitive behavioural courses used in criminal justice
aspire to Duff’s ‘transparent persuasion’: censure of the offending behaviour is
expressed and offenders are encouraged to reflect morally on their offence.
However, the fact that attendance of courses is made compulsory for progression
within the prison means that real persuasion is problematic (see also Schinkel,
2014). Most of the men reported only attending them to secure their progression
within the prison:
No, it’s sort of that, up there, it’s just a numbers game. And they sort of try to frighten
you with, you don’t do that, you don’t get your parole. People do it and people just go
on and sit in a class and just say nothing. And they cannae do nothing because the
boy’s just sitting there, y’know. (Graham)
By making courses compulsory for progression, formal compliance (meeting the
minimum requirements, i.e. ‘just sitting there’) rather than substantive compliance
(actively engaging with what is on offer) (Robinson and McNeill, 2008) is
encouraged.
The general absence of an intentional and meaningful dialogue about crime and
punishment initiated by prison staff is best illustrated by some of the men’s com-
ments on the experience of being interviewed. For example, Alan said ‘you’ve
listened to me but I don’t get asked these questions anywhere else in the jail so
nobody really (.)’. This silence around questions of wrongdoing and legitimacy of
punishment (which has also been noted in the French context (Herzog-Evans,
2011)), makes it very easy for prisoners not to engage with these questions.
A further limiting factor on moral communication taking place within the prison
was the way in which the men adapted to their prison sentence. In order to make
bearing their confinement easier, the men adopted a strategy of ‘getting your head
down’ – limiting thoughts to events within the prison. As Doug said ‘when you’ve
got years tae go and you just don’t think aboot it and it’s just (.) your head’s in
here, this is your life in here you know what I mean, in this wee small surrounding’.
This strategy included accepting one’s sentence:
You have to say ‘this is it, this is me for the next x amount of years, I’m not going out
anyway, so (.), you know, just get on with it, try to make the best of it. (Neil)
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It’s still fair, I’m here, I’m doing it. It doesn’t have to be fair, that’s how I’m dealing with
it. (Peter, emphasis added)
As Peter’s quote illustrates, however, this strategy had the effect of further
silencing normative questions around their offence and their sentence. Because
there was such pressure on the men to accept their sentence in order to make
surviving it easier, this acceptance was decoupled from their thoughts on their
crime and punishment. Even those who maintained they were innocent neverthe-
less acquiesced in their sentence by linking it to past or possible future
wrongdoing:
Maybe a sentence was just waiting to happen. Maybe no/maybe not as much
or as long a sentence, but with the crowd I was running about with at the time,
pretty much, see, there was maybe a sentence in the making, you know what I
mean? (Gordon)
Under such circumstances, any normative message meant to be conveyed by the
prison sentence will be rendered irrelevant.
None of my interviewees perceived the communicative meaning of a need for
exclusion that Duff ascribes to prison sentences. Why this might be the case can be
usefully explored by referring to the men’s views on incapacitation. Incapacitation
was only perceived by the men as a purpose of their imprisonment when they saw
themselves as dangerous, or when it was explicitly mentioned as a purpose by the
court, as illustrated by the following two quotes:
I think my sentence at the time did achieve its purpose, they just wanted me off the
street at the time, cause AT THE TIME I was very dangerous. (Stephen)
That was in the judge’s report, basically if I’m locked away then the public has less
chance of getting harmed. And the witnesses or whatever. (Gordon)
Perceptions of other purposes were also generally due to either a perception of
need (notably rehabilitation and reform) or information from other sources, usu-
ally the judge’s comments or the court report. As none of the court actors or
reports framed the sentence as communicating a need for exclusion, none of the
men were induced by the court to see their sentence as such. And while some of the
men felt they needed to be incapacitated because of what they might otherwise do,
none saw themselves as needing to be excluded because they had already broken the
bonds of society. It is likely that this is at least in part because this conceptualisa-
tion of imprisonment is not part of the public discourse and common understand-
ings of criminal punishment. However, it may also be because the men, like many
in relation to incapacitation, had no reason to see themselves as needing to be
excluded (see below).
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Conclusion
This article has looked in some depth at the way in which long-term prisoners’
accounts of their sentence resonated with portrayals of criminal punishment as
moral communication. It has highlighted important aspects in which current prac-
tice and Duff’s theory of punishment diverge. First of all, little explicit moral
communication was perceived by the men. They described any moral dialogue
and censure as patchy at best and there was no consistent moral message attached
to long-term imprisonment. My interviewees had had very little guidance in think-
ing about their crime and their punishment, instead being left to create their own
meanings. The findings here furthermore suggest that any censure in the courtroom
is unlikely to be taken on board, at least when long-term sentences are imposed.
Moral censure from the judge was generally either not perceived (sometimes wil-
fully so) or opposed. Moreover, with long-term prison sentences looming, the men
were not able or willing to pay much attention to moral communication or to
engage with the court as a moral arena.
Within the prison, the only consistent communicative input came from struc-
tured group-work programmes. The question is whether moral communication
should be delivered solely through such programmes. Burnett (2004) has argued
for a return to one-to-one counselling for offenders in order to support the desis-
tance process. More one-to-one input would also seem welcome in order to get
prisoners to reflect on their sentence and to give it a meaning within their lives.
However, the extent to which moral communication could be delivered through
long-term sentences was limited by the adaptation strategy adopted by the men. In
order to cope, they shrunk their world down to the prison walls and accepted their
sentence. The importance of accepting the sentence in this context means that any
discussion that leads to a more critical understanding of the sentence would either
be resisted or make the sentence harder to bear. In the case of the former, the
communication will not have had an impact; in the case of the latter it will exacer-
bate the pains of imprisonment precisely for those who have reason to oppose it,
which cannot be a desired outcome. I do not want to suggest that the adaptation
process described here is necessary for all (long-term) prisoners. Different prisons
and different conditions within them will support different adaptations. For exam-
ple, Liebling et al. (2011) have recently described how prisoners in Whitemoor,
where surveillance was all-pervasive and staff–prisoner relations poor, tried to
forget they were in prison as much as possible, rather than forgetting the outside
world. They also were much more likely than my interviewees to oppose their
sentence. Similarly, remand prisoners in Norway, who are still involved in an
adversarial process with the criminal justice system generally saw the system in
negative terms (Ugelvik, 2013). What this shows, though, is that different forms
and environments of imprisonment create their own pressures, which are likely to
take precedence over the need to reflect on the punishment in relation to the crime
committed. This means that such sentences are less than ideally suited for the
communicative purpose ascribed to them by Duff (2001). Applying Duff’s theory
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in the ‘real world’ of sentencing might require us to cap explicitly the length of
imprisonment that can be imposed, as this article has shown that longer sentences
create emotional reactions and pressures to cope that overshadow any communi-
cation inherent in the sanction. Duff’s (2001: 151, emphasis in original) character-
isation of three years’ imprisonment as a ‘very harsh punishment’ shows that a limit
on the length of sentences is already evident in his work, if not explicit.
Furthermore, for current practice to come closer to realising Duff’s theory, the
findings reported here suggest court processes and the content of prison sentences
would need to be changed. If the court is to be experienced as a moral arena, its
processes need to be re-imagined so that the outcome is more straightforwardly
related to the offence. The adversarial nature of the process, plea-bargaining, giving
time off for an early guilty plea and other elements would have to be re-considered,
and there could be greater involvement of the offender in the determination of the
appropriate punishment (Weaver, 2009). Equally, the moral-dialogical aspect of
punishment might need to be more carefully attended to in the execution of sen-
tences, perhaps as an alternative to pedagogical forms of rehabilitation. Even in the
context of shorter sentences, a facilitated dialogue about the moral connection
between crime and punishment could complement the court process in facilitating
moral reflection, without making this overly painful for those for whom this con-
nection is less secure.
Most seriously, however, current practice falls short of Duff’s theory in the kinds
of offences for which imprisonment is imposed. Duff (2001: 151) has not attempted
to define precisely what offences break the bonds of community to the extent that
communicating a need for exclusion is appropriate. He writes:
Any answer depends on the community’s understanding of what kinds of wrong make
community impossible. But that understanding can change, and itself depends not
merely on the character of the wrongs involved but on the willingness of other mem-
bers of the community to live with those who commit them.
When this statement is applied to the crimes committed by some of the men I
interviewed, it would seem that its criteria do not apply. One obvious candidate
for ‘the gravest of crimes’ would be murder, but while several of my interviewees
had caused someone else to die, it is not clear that their acts would cause others to
shun them. Graham threw one punch, and only caused death because of an unlucky
fall and previous health issues of the deceased. While the consequences were tragic,
it is unlikely that he would be condemned as ‘beyond the pale’ by the wider com-
munity. Tim and Mohammed both injured (and in one case killed) someone who
was simultaneously attacking them. When two boys or young men with knives
attack each other, society at large may be horrified that such things happen, but
is less likely to be horrified by the actions of the accused alone, given that the victim
was also actively involved in the violence. Other offences more obviously did not
break the bonds of community, including carrying a knife (Lino) and selling small
amounts of drugs (many others), especially since, on Duff’s (2001) account,
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criminal history should generally not be taken into consideration. Most of the
interviewees who had conceivably committed crimes that broke the bonds of com-
munity tended to be men who had not benefited from inclusion in the community in
the first place. As Duff (2001: 184, emphasis in original) writes:
To suggest that those who have been systematically excluded or unjustly disadvan-
taged may not be bound by the law . . . is not to suggest that their criminal actions are
justified, permissible or excusable . . . It is, rather, to suggest that their actions are not
wrong qua criminal: that they are not to be judged (justified, excused, or condemned)
by the law, in terms of its demands and requirements.
For both these groups of men, then, imprisonment as an expression of their
wrongdoing, intended to make them reflect and repent, cannot justify their sen-
tence, according to Duff’s theory. Sentencing will need to be re-examined, and the
systematic exclusion of those who (go on to) offend taken more seriously, so that it
is only those who have been sufficiently part of the community and committed acts
that merit exclusion from this community who are imprisoned.
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Notes
1. In transcribing the interviews, the following notation was used:
(.) pause (if longer than one second, duration indicated by number between brackets)
[laughs] non-verbal utterances
[town] substituting generic labels for specific names, to safeguard anonymity
/overlapping speech or aborted statements
UPPER CASE emphasis in speech
2. Table 1 and some small sections of text have been adapted from Schinkel (2014).
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